6.5
CVSS V3
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Start for freeNetty vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling due to malformed Transfer-Encoding
Netty incorrectly parses malformed Transfer-Encoding, enabling request smuggling attacks.
Netty incorrectly marks a request as chunked when malformed "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity" is present. According to RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9112#name-message-body-length
" If a Transfer-Encoding header field is present in a request and the chunked transfer coding is not the final encoding, the message body length cannot be determined reliably; the server MUST respond with the 400 (Bad Request) status code and then close the connection. "
A possible scenario is when Netty is behind a proxy that doesn't reject requests with "Transfer-Encoding: chunked, identity", but prefers "Content-Length" and forwards the content to Netty.
The test below shows Netty successfully parsing the second request, demonstrating how an attacker can smuggle a second request inside a request body.
HTTP Request Smuggling: Attacker injects arbitrary HTTP requests